19961202 045

July 1987

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188

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of information, including suggestions for reducing Davis Highway. Suite 1204, Arlington. VA 22202	-4302, and to the Office of Management and Bu	udget. Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave Blank)	2. REPORT DATE	RED					
	July 1987	Final					
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE	. 5. FUNDING NUMBERS						
A Selective, Annotated Bibliogram							
6. AUTHOR(S)							
Rodney Katz							
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME	8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER						
Federal Research Division Library of Congress Washington, DC 20540-4840							
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENC	10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER						
N/A							
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES							
Prepared under an Interagency	Agreement						
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STA	12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE						
Approved for public release; di							
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14. SUBJECT TERMS			15. NUMBER OF PAGES				
North Korea National security			16. PRICE CODE				
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT				
UNCLASSIFIED	UNCLASSIFIED	UNCLASSIFIED	SAR				

PREFACE

This bibliography provides selective annotations of open-source material and covers the following topics:

- modernization of the North Korean Army,
- North Korean Army strategy and tactics in the Korean War, and
- North Korean Army strategy and tactics since the Korean War.

The bibliography incorporates serials and monographs received in the previous month and is part of a continuing series on the above subjects.

Entries are arranged alphabetically by author or title. Library of Congress call numbers, where appropriate, are included to facilitate the recovery of works cited.

GLOSSARY

CPLA Chinese People's Liberation Army

CFC Combined Forces Command (US and ROK)

DPRK Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)

NKA North Korean Army

NKAF North Korean Air Force

NKN North Korean Navy

KPA Korean People's Army (Comprises NKA, NKAF, and NKN)

KWP Korean Workers' Party

ROK Republic of Korea (South Korea)

ROKA Republic of Korea Army

ROKAF Republic of Korea Air Force

ROKN Republic of Korea Navy 1. MODERNIZATION OF THE NORTH KOREAN MILITARY

"North Korean Imports of Equipment for Military Use on Steady Increase." <u>Choson Ilbo</u> (Seoul), 10 June 1987. In <u>Press</u> <u>Translations</u> (US Embassy, Seoul), 10 June 1987, pp. 2,3.

Some of Japan's trade with North Korea is said to be militarily significant. For example, large-sized trucks exported to North Korea by Nissan are reportedly being used as missile launching platforms. Additionally, some NKA units are said to be using radios and other communication equipment produced in Japan. The article calls on Japanese companies to stop using loopholes in COCOM regulations to continue sales of equipment and technology useful to the armed forces of Communist countries.

"Organization, Function, Structure of Armed Forces Reviewed."

<u>Pukhan Chongchiron</u> (Seoul), 1984, pp. 280-291. In JPRS

KAR-87-029, 12 May 1987, pp. 93-107.

This appears to be one chapter of a South Korean book that deals with North Korea. It includes an organization chart for the Ministry of the People's Armed Forces and various other military organizations, including the special forces. Most of the information provided in this source probably originated with official South Korean government publications on the North Korean military.

Pae Myong-o. "An Analysis of South and North Korean Military Power." Tongil Nonchong (Seoul), No. 6, December 1986, pp. 79, 103-112. In JPRS-KAR-87-032, 26 May 1987, pp. 41-52.

This article suggests that the 1985-86 edition of Military Balance, published by the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London, underestimates various aspects of North Korea's military strength. For example, the author maintains that the NKA has four mechanized corps, not three as listed in Military Balance. The military significance of the reorganization of NKA units and the importance of Soviet support for North Korea's military modernization program are also discussed.

US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. World Military
Expenditures and Arms Tranfers, 1986. Washington DC: US
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1987, 161 pp.
JX1974.AU52

North Korea's total military expenditures for 1984, the latest year for which information is available, are estimated at US\$ 5.2 billion. In the same year, North Korea is believed to have devoted 22.6 percent of its gross national product to defense. As a comparison, North Korea is reported to have spent US\$ 1.37 billion, or about 15.5 percent of its gross national product on defense in 1974. In 1985, North Korea was the 16th largest exporter of weapons in the world with almost all of its sales going to the Middle East and North Africa. The principal export items include the T-62 tank, Type 303 armored personnel carrier, various types of self-propelled artillery, and the MI-2 Hoplite helicopter.

"With Tales of Food Rationing." <u>Country Report: China, North Korea</u> (London), No. 1, 1987, pp. 32,3. HC426.Q37

A North Korean who defected to South Korea via Japan in January 1987 reported that the North Korean Government requires civilians to contribute approximately 48 days of food per person each year to the country's war reserve. Choi Pong-rye, one of eleven North Koreans who fled from Chongjin in a 50-ton boat, said that food rations are distributed every two weeks and consist of 30 percent rice and 70 percent cereals. Choi said that corruption and shortages of necessities, such as clothing, are serious problems in North Korea.

Yu, Kwang-chin. "Changes in the Military Strength of North and South Korea and the Security of the Korean Peninsula."

<u>Chongyok Anbo</u> (Seoul), February 1987, pp. 16-24. In JPRS-KAR-87-029, 12 May 1987, pp. 80-92.

The author argues that North Korean military strength has increased significantly since 1978. He points out that in

1978 South Korea had an advantage in the number of military personnel with 642,000 men compared to the North's 512,000. Now the KPA has an advantage of 1.4-to-1 and, furthermore, the deployment of its troops would facilitate a quick strike into South Korea. The author believes that North Korean leaders maintain superiority in men and weapons as part of a plan to attack the South when the political situation on the Korean Peninsula is more favorable to the North. The article includes seven tables that document the growth of the KPA in the last decade. The primary source of information for the tables is Military Balance published annually by the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London.

2. NORTH KOREAN ARMY STRATEGY AND TACTICS IN THE KOREAN WAR

Heller, Francis H., ed. <u>The Korea War: A 25-Year Perspective</u>. Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas, 1977. 251 pp. DS919.K67

Chapter 5, by Robert R. Simmons, focuses on the author's perception that the Soviet Union did not deliver some of its most modern types of weapons to either North Korea or China during the Korean War because it did not want the conflict to spread to Soviet territory. For example, Simmons says that the largest artillery piece provided to the NKA was the 122-mm M1938. He argues that if the Soviets had been more serious about Korea they would have sent heavier guns, such as the 152-mm M1943 howitzer or the 152-mm M1937 gun. Simmons also believes that neither Moscow nor Beijing knew in advance the exact date chosen by North Korean leaders to attack the South.

Rees, David, ed. <u>The Korean War: History and Tactics</u>. New York: Crescent Books, 1984. 128 pp. Illustrations. Maps. DS918.K565

Several of the accounts in this book provide very useful information on the tactics and weapons used by both the CPLA and NKA during the Korean War. In chapter 1, the author notes that while most North Korean soldiers had been trained in China during World War II and the Chinese Civil War, Kim Il-song preferred Soviet military doctrine and the NKA used Soviet tactics effectively in the early days of the war. Reportedly, Soviet advisors were present and appreciated by both the CPLA and KPA throughout the These Soviet advisors are said to have been instrumental in rebuilding the strength of the NKA to 10 divisions before the end of the war in July 1953. The author suggests that North Korean leaders were more adept than their Chinese counterparts in maintaining the morale of their troops, and credits this achievement to a successful political indoctrination program, and the fact that Chinese soldiers were not easily motivated to fight after the war was reduced to a stalemate.

3.	NORTH	ARMY	STRATEGY	TACTICS		

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"China Won't Back North Korean Invasion of South." Korea Herald (Seoul), 6 June 1987, p. 1.

Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping reportedly told Junya Yano, head of Japan's Komeito Party, that China would not support a North Korean invasion of South Korea. The Korea Herald says that Deng's statement to Yano is the most open expression of policy by a Chinese official on this issue. It is noted in the article that the Chinese believe that South Korea is stronger militarily than North Korea.

Darlon, Damon. "South Korea Fears North Will Try to Drown Olympics." Asian Wall Street Journal (Hong Kong), 15 April 1987, pp. 1,6.

The article notes that North Korea's construction of the Kumgangsan Dam on the Han River has increased tension between Seoul and Pyongyang, but suggests that there is insufficient intelligence available to substatiate the South Korean Government's claim that in the event of war the North plans to blow up the dam thereby causing large scale flooding south of the DMZ.

Olsen, Edward A. The Armed Forces in Contemporary Asian Societies. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986. 215 pp. UA830.A764

Chapter 5 of this book is on North Korea. The author, Gregory F. T. Winn, says that the size of the KPA, and the "siege mentality" of North Korean leaders, suggest that the Kim Il-song regime is prepared to use force to reunify the two Koreas. Winn notes four possible attack scenarios. First, Pyongyang could undertake a small-scale military offensive against South Korean-controlled islands in the Yellow Sea. Second, it could use tunnels located under the DMZ to infiltrate special forces into South Korea. Third, it could attempt an all-out blitzkrieg against Seoul. Fourth, it could try to link up with dissident groups in the South. The fourth option would also utilize the NKA special forces. Winn believes that North Korea will remain one of the world's most militarized societies for the foreseeable future.

"Opposition to Japan's Defense Sharing: Moving of US 7th Fleet to Break Balance of Power." <u>Choson Ilbo</u> (Seoul), 24 May 1987. In <u>Press Translations</u> (US Embassy, Seoul), 26 May 1987, pp. 2,3.

This editorial argues that Japan should not increase its military forces as part of a US-Japanese agreement for sharing the burden of defending Northeast Asia against Soviet aggression. The major point of the article is that Japan could not stand alone against the Soviet Union and, in the end analysis, only the United States can preserve the status quo in the region. The South Korean daily suggests that a US-Soviet agreement calling for both sides to remove medium range nuclear missiles from their current positions would be disadvantageous to Free World countries because the conventional military balance favors the Soviet Union and its allies.

"Pyongyang Proposes DMZ Patrols by Neutral Nations." <u>Korea Herald</u> (Seoul), 29 May 1987, p. 1.

A recent report by the Japanese daily <u>Sankei Shimbun</u> says that North Korea is interested in having neutral nations provide troops to patrol the DMZ in order to prevent an outbreak of war between North and South Korea. Reportedly, North Korea proposed to Sweden and Switzerland in April that those two countries assume responsibility for patrolling the southern sector of the DMZ at the same time that Czechoslovakia and Poland begin similar activities in the northern sector of the neutral zone. The <u>Korea Herald</u> suggests it is unlikely that North Korea is serious about the plan because it probably could not come up with the \$10 million a year it would need to fund its part of the cost for maintaining such a peacekeeping force.

"Sea Lane Security Vital for Maritime Transport." Korea Herald (Seoul), 18 June 1987, pp. 3,7.

South Korean and Japanese scholars attended a Seoul conference on sea lane security in Asia and the Pacific held at Yonsei University on 16 and 17 June. This article reports on those statements by attendees of the conference

that highlight various aspects of the Soviet and North Korean military threat to both countries. According to the <u>Korea Herald</u> there is a growing realization in Japan and South Korea that the maritime interests of the two countries are closely linked and justify increasing bilateral defense cooperation.

"Top Commanders Discuss Unusual North Korean Military Posture."
Korea Herald (Seoul), 25 June 1987, p. 8.

The Korea Herald reports that South Korean Defense Minister Lee Ki-baek called a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 24 June to discuss provocative military activities in North Korea. These are said to include the movement of infantry units into underground shelters close to the DMZ, the call up of a large number of reserves, and the North Korean Government's use of mass rallies to promote support by the people for South Korean dissidents pressing for constitutional reforms. The article emphasizes the need for the South Korean armed forces to maintain a high level of readiness in the event that North Korea attacks the South.